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Abstract. Monetary and fiscal policy constitutes principal macro-policies, even
though they are usually designed and implemented with quite different sometimes even contrary - goals. Although they have a certain degree of
independence mostly in the institutional basis, there is also a considerable level
of interdependence between them. This one is usually found in the literature
with the term “interaction” and then “harmonization” when the country operates
within a monetary union. The first objective of this paper is to shortly identify
main elements of the interaction between macro-policies. The second objective
is to evaluate this mutual interaction among them for the Albanian case with
historical data using each policy reaction function in a non-simultaneous way.
Related to the methodology, there will be a descriptive comparative analysis of
various economic variables indicating ways of interaction between monetary
and fiscal policy also with revisiting their instruments and coordination after the
crisis. Following this theoretical approach, there will be an evaluation on the
mutual interaction, where the methodological approach of the latter relates to
game theory generally analyzing decision situations. The first results of this
work relate to the stabilizing effects of monetary and fiscal policy. The other
results will rely on the changes of one policy as a response of changes in the
other. If this one is statistically approved, we can confirm a presence of
strategic interaction between the two macro-policies. All above mentioned
elements will shed light on some first theoretical and empirical findings for
Albania contributing to a further research debate and work in the field.

Keywords: macro-policies, policy objectives, interaction, policy reaction
functions

1

Introduction

The last crisis indicated that macroeconomic policies must have more objectives and
more instruments when implemented, but the exact answer to the question which
instrument should be directed towards achieving specific economic policy goals
requires time. In general terms, the economic crisis restored the central role of fiscal
policy right after the recognition that monetary policy had reached its limit [17].
Furthermore, it changed the way of understanding on strategies, effects, roles of the
authorities of monetary and fiscal policies.

Furthermore, research has shown that there is a kind of relationship between changes
in monetary and fiscal policies and the large need for stabilizing the economy through
given instruments and the new concept of policy space. As a result of the crisis,
macroeconomic policies would partly change in some of their elements for almost all
economies. In the meanwhile, credibility in designing and implementing policies will
support their overall effectiveness. Last but not least, there is a need to jointly analyze
macroeconomic policies through an interaction approach as an appropriate tool of
analysis for the complex real economies.
Scope of this paper is to identify and describe main elements of the interaction
between the two macroeconomic policies as well as tools of the analysis of the
interaction approach in a theoretical and empirical basis developed in the literature of
the field. There will be an evaluation on the mutual interaction of the policies, with
the methodological approach of the latter relating to game theory widely used in
analyzing decision situations.
The paper will be organized as given below: a brief summary of main research works
in the field of macroeconomic policies for recent instruments and interaction issues,
with a larger focus on the game theory tools of analysis; a theoretical and empirical
evaluation of a model with selected macroeconomic indicators and instruments in the
game theory context, resulting in some conclusions and restrictions of this analysis for
the Albanian case.

2.

Literature review

Both policies can and must be designed and implemented with the aim to amortize
large fluctuations in the economy [18]. By the other side, there are some crucial
points in implementation as issues of any compliance in the objectives of the policies,
an efficient information exchange among respective authorities and a sustainable or a
coherent behavior in time in order to ensure for higher positive effects of macro
policies.
For all economies, an efficient management of the economy depends on the level
of the understanding of internal shocks and their reciprocal effects. Fiscal and
monetary policy with their changes interact through several and complex transmission
channels. Monetary policy affects budget policy through the so-called seigniorage;
inflation rate as a monetary instrument or phenomenon affects level of real public
debt; fiscal discipline has an impact on the monetary authority and its public
credibility; fiscal policy and unexpected inflation affect employment level, as a key
macroeconomic objective of policy interaction. Other similar impacts can also be
mentioned in this context.
Additionally, even though in the very beginning EMU believed the monetary union
could operate without a fiscal one, nowadays there is a totally different view with
numerous studies of analyzing policies in this context. So, in some European
countries, fiscal behavior is not consistent with having the ECB target inflation. Such
inconsistencies can have further implications for inflation, interest rates and
macroeconomic performance. Meanwhile even the conventional view underlies how

countries have designed central banks, but fiscal policy must cooperate and behave
consistently.
According to IMF analysis in 2013[14], central banks must be envisaged to have a
broader macro and financial stability mandate, using monetary and macro prudential
instruments while more actively using fiscal policy tools. The interaction between
macro policies affects though the stabilizing process in the economy, with a sound
fiscal policy providing room for an active monetary policy together with studying the
reactions of the two macro policies to inflation, output gap, interest rate and debt
stabilization.
Walsh (2003)[20] first started with analyzing fiscal policy including also
instruments of the monetary policy. Laubach (2009) and De Mello (2005)[16], 9]
have both analyzed that idea during a recession, when reducing short-term interest
rates results in reduced long-term interest rates parallel with increasing budget deficit
because of the automatic stabilizers. In this context one important finding is the
identification of any potential negative correlation between budget deficit and shortterm interest rates.
Related to policy objectives, there is an output conservatism of fiscal and monetary
authorities, both operating with smoothing policy instruments. According to Aktas et
al., (2009)[2], fiscal dynamics play a very important role in the effectiveness of
monetary policy. By the other side, monetary policy can limit fiscal policy in rather
different ways depending on whether accepting the stabilizing reevaluations of
government debt [19]. Anyway, a conservative monetary policy remains desirable in
all cases of specific economic conditions, especially when fiscal policy is determined
first and monetary authority should explicitly be focused on the inflation stabilizing.
To conclude with this idea, the best results in the objective functions are achieved by
the cooperative Pareto solution supporting a more active role of the central bank.
Welfare is higher under fully optimal policies than under divided policies and this
can be used as a call for rethinking our policy institution arrangements (Leeper,
2014). What advanced economies have done consist in keeping interest rates low for a
long period of time to re-inflate their economies. But, running the non-right fiscal
policies absolutely cannot help in this aspect. Once again, this emphasizes the need to
start and jointly think about monetary and fiscal policy.
To conclude with this theoretical approach, it is true that macro policies are about
what set of rules authorities follow, what are the public expectations about and what
institutions represent. For sure, the structure of the policy is the right answer, but
treating monetary and fiscal policy as completely independent misrepresents
macroeconomic reality. Any attempts for cooperation and consistency between the
two important macro policies is desirable for all economies.

3.

Theoretical and empirical basis for the game theory context

Main assumption of this type of analysis is that when achieving goals of both
policies, there are several issues to be taken into consideration as other
macroeconomic indicators, impacts of their decisions and the behavior or reaction of
the other economic policy authority. As long as several situations may happen, game

theory context is the appropriate method to study such quite different scenarios. With
ensured respective independence, the central bank is focused on stabilizing inflation
through interest rates while fiscal authority aims to stabilize budget through fiscal
deficit.
Below is given the specification model for the fiscal authority. Main instrument of
the policy can change as a function of changes in other important macroeconomic
indicators and specifically the change in the main instrument of the other policy. For
the fiscal policy, a possible reaction function can be:
Δprimbalancet = α0 + α1Δgovdebtt-1 + α2Eyt + α3primbalancet-1 + α4ut +
α5Δit + εt,
With primary balance as a % of the GDP, government debt in absolute value, Eyt
for the output gap, ut for the unemployment rate and it for the short-term interest
rates, representing monetary policy.

4.

Results

There are given below the results from the OLS regression using the fiscal policy
reaction function with quarterly data for the period 2007-2017. Secondary data for the
macroeconomic indicators are taken from the Institute of Statistics, Ministry of
Finance and Bank of Albania database and reports.
Table 1: The reaction function of the fiscal policy
. reg

fdprimbalance fdlgovdebt lprimbalance unemployment fdinterest
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.000530783
.001970841

4
30

.000132696
.000065695

Total

.002501625

34

.000073577

fdprimbala~e

Coef.

fdlgovdebt
lprimbalance
unemployment
fdinterest
_cons

-2.39e-07
-.2407846
-.0004861
.0146201
.0095605

Std. Err.
2.00e-07
.0967961
.0009283
.0088044
.0139653

t
-1.20
-2.49
-0.52
1.66
0.68

Number of obs
F(
4,
30)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.241
0.019
0.604
0.107
0.499

=
=
=
=
=
=

35
2.02
0.1169
0.2122
0.1071
.00811

[95% Conf. Interval]
-6.47e-07
-.4384685
-.002382
-.0033608
-.0189604

1.69e-07
-.0431006
.0014098
.032601
.0380815

Source: Authors calculations
From the above estimation, the only variable statistically significant is that of the
lagged primary balance as a percentage to the GDP, at a 10% of significance. There is
a negative relation for this variable, which implies for an adoptive fiscal policy to the
previous period. For the change in interest rates, which is quasi-significant, there is a
positive relation indicating for a possible coordination with monetary policy.
Although not statistically significant, unemployment and change in the lagged
government debt are represented with negative coefficients which means that the
government is not focused on reducing public debt in absolute terms and conducts an
expansive fiscal policy during periods with increasing unemployment rate.

When compared to the expectations, the only variable with an opposite effect in the
change of the main instrument of the fiscal policy is that of the change in the prior
levels of absolute public debt. We can assume that during the period 2007-2017, fiscal
policy seems to be not seriously committed to the fiscal consolidation and its
outcomes. The other variables have the signs in interpretation as expected based on
the theory and other tools of analysis.
Table 2: The reaction function of the fiscal policy

Variable
Δgovdebtt-1
primbalancet-1
ut
Δit

Expected relation
+
+/- (coordination/conflict)

Factual relation
+

Source: Authors calculations
These results using OLS regressions can be accepted and though interpreted with
the respective signs, coefficient values and statistical significance. Anyway, models of
SEM (simultaneous equations) can be more appropriate, as all included important
macroeconomic indicators can be tested as dependent and independent with a set of
different equations, which is quite complex in the same time.
In the case of Albania, as a restriction for this model can be mentioned the quality
of the macroeconomic indicators especially when used in quarterly data. For the
model presented in this paper, we have not included “output gap” as a variable,
indicating for restrictive macroeconomic policies when positive (actual product above
the potential level) as analyzed by Kappel and Janku, 2014[15]. In the case of having
the reaction functions for the two macroeconomic policies, we can also conclude for
dominant roles in the game theory context when assuming for coordinated decisions.

5.

Conclusions

For the Albanian economy, determining the dependence of both policies on the
changing macroeconomic environment, on the extent of fulfilling their policy
objectives as well as on the behavior of the other policy remain a very interesting and
crucial point. For all the economies, jointly analyzing fiscal and monetary policy with
their specific behavior and interaction seems to be more interesting and efficient tool
of analysis in the current macroeconomic field.
Even the simplest models indicate for a level of interaction and coordination
between the two macroeconomic policies. In the same time, improving quality of the
macroeconomic indicators and using more complex specification models will help in
advancing research in this context with theoretical and empirical findings for Albania.
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